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Abstract
In this article we analyse how labour market imperfections affect training hours 
using a firms panel from Spain. In fact, we use the scope of collective bargaining as a 
proxy for the relative strength of organized labour because of the Spanish institutional 
framework. We find a clear and relevant positive effect of collective agreements at the 
firm level on training, measured as hours lost from work and devoted to training. As 
this type of collective agreements is also associated with higher wage compression we 
interpret this result as supporting the Acemoglu-Pischke model on training in imper-
fectly competitive labour markets.
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1. Introduction
The main objective of this article is analyzing how the scope of collective bargain-
ing affects the amount of training hours in firms. As we are using Spanish data, the 
scope of collective bargaining will be a proxy for the varying strength of organised la-
bour in firms because of the institutional framework of the Spanish labour market. The 
existence of a collective agreement at the firm level means that workers are organised 
to defend their interests (usually joining unions but not in all cases). The main reason 
is that there are no workers without collective bargaining coverage because of the erga 
omnes principle of the Spanish Labour Law. Therefore, differences come from the dif-
ferent scopes of the collective agreements: establishment or firm agreements versus 
above firm-level agreements. The influence of the scope of collective bargaining will 
inform us about the relative influence of organised labour on training. Along these lines, 
a relevant novelty of this article is that it considers the institutional framework of the 
labour market explicitly when analysing the impact of organized labour on training.
A relatively recent line of economic research —represented by Acemoglu and Pis-
chke (1998 and 1999a) — has developed models whereby it is possible to understand 
the amount of human capital investments when labour markets are imperfectly com-
petitive. In particular, when labour market frictions reduce the wages of skilled workers 
when compared to wages of unskilled workers, firms may provide and pay for general 
training, which is a contradiction of the traditional statement of Becker (Becker, 1975). 
The compression of the wage structure may induce firms to provide and pay for general 
training and, therefore, some typical labour market institutions (such as trade unions) 
causing wage compression may increase one of the components of human capital in-
vestment, and even contribute to total human capital accumulation. Given that in the 
Spanish institutional framework, collective bargaining at the firm level is a proxy for 
a greater presence of organised labour in firms (and following Canal and Rodríguez, 
2004, these firms have a significantly higher wage compression), we should observe 
more training hours financed by firms with respect to firms covered by agreements of 
higher levels, and this will be the main prediction to be tested in the empirical analy-
sis. Therefore, our article should be considered as part of the growing literature about 
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the effects of the market structure (here in terms of the institutional framework of the 
labour market) on training provision.
The database used in this article is the Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral (ECL) or the 
Survey of Economic Situation, launched by the Spanish Ministry of Employment. The 
ECL is a quarterly longitudinal survey on firms which obtains information on stocks 
and worker turnover at the establishment level, and, of course, the scope of the collec-
tive bargaining and the amount of working hours lost because of training (in hours). For 
the purpose of this study, we use data on establishments having 500 or more workers 
during the period 1/1993-1/20021. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the second section, we briefly present 
the literature on the influence of unions on training. We also discuss the importance of 
the scope of collective bargaining in Spain and of the previous work showing that the 
relative effects of bargaining at firm level are in along the same lines of union member-
ship in other institutional frameworks. In the third section, we describe the main fea-
tures of the data base and present the empirical analysis. The last section summarizes 
the main results of the article.
2. Training, unions and the scope of collective bargaining
2.1. Unions and Training
The effect of unions on training can be direct or indirect. A direct effect would be 
the result of an explicit union strategy to increase the human capital of its affiliates. 
Some reasons to adopt such an objective would be to increase wages and chances for 
promotion inside the firm, because usually a higher investment in training is related 
to a more successful career and better results in internal labour markets. A higher 
investment in specific training could be beneficial for the worker even considering a 
job change outside the firm when training is ‘portable’ or ‘visible’ thanks to a certifi-
cate. Those workers dismissed during a recession will have better prospects of being 
re-hired by other firms if they can prove, with a certificate, that under normal cir-
cumstances they were so valuable to their previous firms as to deserve specific train-
ing. Ceteris paribus, such certificate would be a positive characteristic to take into 
1 This is the only stratum of establishments for which detailed longitudinal information on 
gross flows of workers is made available. 
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account in the job search. Authors, such as Rainbird (1990), stress that the declining 
trend in union membership has led some unions to enhance the quality and quantity 
of training as a way of making themselves more attractive to workers. In Spain, 
unions are involved in national pacts with employers’ organisations (and sometimes 
the government) to finance workers training2, in special continuous training. See, for 
example, Rigby (2002) for a study on the role of unions in the provision of continu-
ous training in Spain.
The indirect effects of unions on training are potentially related to the effects of 
unions on the level and structure of wages, and on labour turnover. In this vein, Mincer 
(1983) proposed that as unions reduce labour turnover and increase wages and fringe 
benefits, employees will be discouraged from investing in general training. However, 
as unions reduce turnover, the incentives for the firm to invest in specific training will 
increase. Therefore, the Mincer hypothesis was that the effect on total human capital 
accumulation is ambiguous (the decrease in general training is not necessarily equal 
to the increase in specific training), but unambiguously unions would increase specific 
training. In spite of the Mincer hypothesis, until very recently the most common belief 
among economists was that unions, through their effects on wage compression, reduce 
investments in human capital3 (Lindbeck et al., 1993). On one hand, we have research 
on the US labour market confirming a negative influence (see, among others, authors 
Duncan and Stafford, 1980, and Barron et al., 1987). On the other hand, we have other 
works from other labour markets and they frequently find a positive union influence on 
training. See Arulampalam and Booth (1998), Green (1993), Green et al. (1999), and 
Booth et al. (2003) for the UK, and Kennedy et al. (1994) for Australia. Some authors 
even find a positive influence for the US, as Lynch (1992), Veum (1995), Osterman 
(1995) Frazis et al. (1995).
2 However, sometimes such strategies have been cited as being an indirect way of obtaining 
additional funding for the bureaucratic structure of unions and employers’ organisations rather 
than an investment in training with significant returns for workers. See Martínez-Lucio and Stuart 
(2003) for a review about how Spanish unions and employers’ organizations have progressively 
included training as part of their organizational strategies.
3 A theoretical prediction of a negative (but indirect) effect is provided by Ryan (1991) [quoted 
by Green (1993)]. If unions successfully press the firms to establish a wage mark-up for trained 
workers, then they raise the costs of training for the firm, giving incentives to the firm to invest 
less in training. The model is based on asymmetric information and uncertainty about the costs 
and quality of training inputs.
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Recently, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998; 1999a; 1999b) have brought up the issue 
of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets, providing a theoretical reasoning 
for a positive influence of labour market institutions on training through increases in 
wage compression. According to these authors, if labour market imperfections com-
press wages structure, firms may provide and pay for general training. The rationale 
for this unexpected result under the traditional human capital theory is due to labour 
market imperfections (in this case, unions). The labour market imperfections would 
cause trained workers not to obtain their marginal product when they change jobs, 
converting general skills into specific ones. The Acemoglu-Pischke model proposes 
that firms will have incentives to invest in general training for their workers4. This 
result leads Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) to affirm that total training investment in 
imperfect labour markets might be even greater than in competitive labour markets. 
Booth and Zoega (2004) have generalized the Acemoglu-Pischke model showing the 
different impact of changes in absolute and relative wage compression, and they argue 
that, although relative wage compression is not a necessary condition for the firms’ 
willingness to pay for general training, it does increase the firms’ incentives to pay for 
workers’ general training.5
To sum up, we have a ‘received wisdom’ considering a negative effect of unions on 
training to be more likely, although there are some theoretical models (and some em-
pirical articles) alleging that this effect would be positive on some components of train-
ing, especially on general training, when labour market ‘frictions’ are associated with 
wage compression. Therefore, it is an empirical question whether organised labour has 
a negative or a positive effect on training or not, although confirming the existence of 
wage compression associated with the alleged ‘labour market friction’ became crucial 
in supporting predictions of the Acemoglu-Pischke model.
4 Previously, other authors such as Green (1993) had included intuitive explanations in the same 
way in order to explain that employers bear a substantial proportion of the costs of general training.
5 In addition, the exit-voice theory proposed by Freeman (1980) provides additional support for a 
positive relationship between unions and training, inducing firms to provide general training for their 
employees. Following Green (1993) as the voice effect of unions decreases turnover, the cost of training 
investment will be lower in unionised firms, and, in addition, one aspect of the management response to 
the union voice may be closer attention to training needs. García-Serrano and Malo (2002) have shown 
that collective agreements at the firm level are associated with voice effects such as lower turnover and 
quit rates, and higher dismissal rates (with respect to above levels of collective bargaining).
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2.2. What does the scope of collective bargaining mean in Spain?
The Spanish case provides an interesting context for this empirical analysis because 
of the peculiarities of the Spanish institutional framework. In Spain, all workers are 
de facto covered by a collective agreement because of the erga omnes principle of the 
Spanish Labour Law6. This principle ensures the ex-ante application of the conditions 
established the parties in the collective bargaining at each level to every worker. There-
fore, although far from all workers being affiliated a union, all workers are covered by 
the agreements of some worker’ representatives and the respective employers’ organi-
sations. Therefore, in Spain the difference between unionised and non-unionised work-
ers is not relevant and membership is mainly explained by such ideological reasons as 
feeling closer to a left-wing ideology (Rodríguez, 1996). The differences come from 
the different levels of the collective bargaining.
In Spain, there are multiple levels of bargaining: national economy-wide bargain-
ing (only used in the eighties); industry-level bargaining between the representatives 
of employers’ associations and workers associations resulting in industry agreements 
whose geographical scope might be the whole nation but is usually the province; and 
finally firm-level bargaining between employer and worker representatives.
Unions and employers’ organizations decide the level of bargaining, not the State7. 
Unions and employers’ associations encourage industry and above firm-level agree-
ments where their ability to impose organizational objectives is greater than at the firm/
plant level. In fact, most workers depend on province-industry level agreements. The 
firm (or plant) level can have two types of worker representatives: the groups of union-
ized workers in the establishment (in Spanish, secciones sindicales) and the works 
councils (comités de empresa). The works councils can only exist in firms with 50 
employees or more, and have enjoyed an important prestige among workers in Spain 
6 For the details of the Spanish legal framework on unions and collective bargaining see, for 
example, Jimeno and Toharia (1993) or Martínez Lucio (1998). For a general statement about 
unions and training in Spain (but not focusing on the relevance of the scope of collective bargain-
ing) see Rigby (2002).
7 However, usually for collective bargaining above the firm level there is not an explicit choice 
of the level of bargaining. Then, the level is simply the level of past negotiations, and many times 
the geographical distribution of collective bargaining is very similar to the restricted and very lim-
ited collective bargaining of the Francoist dictatorship (when free unions where simply banned).
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since the early 1980s. Both of them can be worker representatives in the collective bar-
gaining at the firm level, although the scarce data available show a greater importance 
of works councils as workers’ representatives8 (see, for example, Jimeno and Toharia, 
1993, or Malo, 2005).
An eventual problem linked to this structure of collective bargaining is the possibil-
ity of successive negotiations from higher to lower levels. If wage increases obtained 
at above bargaining levels are taken as given, then successive agreements at lower 
levels will increase wages up to the firm-level where we should observe the highest 
wages. Spanish literature on bargained wages confirms that workers covered by a col-
lective agreement at the firm level enjoy higher wages than the rest of workers (see, for 
example, Abellán et al., 1997). However, a deeper analysis of the Spanish collective 
bargaining shows that some industries (such as construction or the chemical industry) 
are specialized in sectoral agreements, while others (such as electricity distribution or 
the automobile industry) are specialized in firm-level agreements, and, in fact, concur-
rence of agreements of different levels only affects a maximum of 12 percent of the 
total workers (Fina et al., 2001)9.
Considering the different levels of collective bargaining in Spain, the firm level 
means an organised presence of unions in the firm and/or a bargaining capability of the 
works councils in firms with 50 or more employees. Previous research has confirmed 
that the role played by firm level agreements is similar to union coverage in American 
or British labour markets. In this way, García-Serrano and Malo (2002) find evidence 
about a typical voice effect in those firms with this type of collective agreements; de-
creasing total turnover and quit rates, and increasing dismissal rates. In addition, Ca-
nal and Rodríguez (2004) confirm that in Spanish firms with firm-level bargaining 
there is a higher wage compression than in those firms with recognised unions in the 
United Kingdom or in the United States. Canal and Rodríguez (2004) show that, us-
ing descriptive information, agreements at the firm level in Spain show greater wage 
8 Usually unionized workers of the establishment are the most common members of the works 
councils. However, many ‘independent’ workers are members of works councils (and, probably, 
this is part of the social prestige of this institution among workers). For further details about Span-
ish works councils see, for example, Escobar (1995).
9 In addition, some authors (such as Jimeno, 1992) have observed a sort of specialization by lev-
els. Bargaining at the industry level is almost exclusively focused on wages and working hours, while 
firm-level bargaining (almost exclusively in large firms) is more detailed and includes (in addition to 
wages) agreements on absenteeism, productivity, etc., although explicit bargaining over employment 
is rarely observed.
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dispersion: the log of the standard deviation of gross hourly wage is 5.797 for firms 
with a collective agreement at the firm level and 5.151 for firms with a sectoral agree-
ment (Canal and Rodríguez, 2004, Table A.5). However, this difference responds to a 
composition effect in the intra-firm wage dispersion. When these authors estimate the 
determinants of wage dispersion and the decomposition of wage dispersion using the 
traditional Oaxaca-Blinder methodology, they find that collective agreements clearly 
reduce gross wage dispersion. This negative effect ranges from 19.8 % to 53.3 % (Ca-
nal and Rodríguez, 2004, Table 4) depending on the wages structure taken as reference 
in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (the first one corresponds to the reference of 
firms with a collective agreement at the firm level and the second one to firms with a 
sectoral agreement).
Note that the existence of labour market friction not being sufficient for firm invest-
ment in additional general training, following the Acemoglu-Pischke model, is incor-
rect. Such friction should be related to a compression of the wage structure, as it is for 
Spanish collective agreements at the firm level. In this vein, in Spain this wage com-
pression corresponds to an explicit strategy of Spanish unions to care less for skilled 
than for unskilled workers (Dolado et al. 1999; Rodríguez, 2001; Bover et al., 2002), 
which corresponds to the Acemoglu-Pischke requirement that the compression of the 
wage structure must be greater for more skilled workers.
Therefore, we expect that where firm-level bargaining exists there will be an in-
crease in training, because it is a channel for the direct intervention of organized la-
bour and its documented effect on firms’ wage compression. The existence of such 
an effect on training would improve the knowledge regarding the impact of workers’ 
representation institutions beyond the institutional contexts characterised by the di-
chotomy between unionized and non-unionised firms (because in the Spanish case, by 
definition, all firms are covered by a collective agreement and, therefore, there are no 
‘non-unionised’ firms).
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1. Description of the Database and Main Variables 
The data for this research comes from the Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboural (ECL) 
or Survey of Economic Situation. The ECL is a longitudinal survey carried out on a 
quarterly basis since the second quarter of 1990 by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs. In 1997, the ECL underwent important methodological changes involv-
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ing the inclusion of establishments with fewer than 5 workers in the survey sample 
along with a new sample stratification methodology. The ECL considers the following 
groups of plant size: 1-2, 3-5, 6-10; 11-25; 26-50; 51-100; 101-250; 251-500; and more 
than 500. The total sample consists of about 12,000 establishments. The survey cov-
ers non-agriculture industries but excludes the public administration, military forces, 
social security, diplomatic delegations, and international and religious organisations 
from the service sector. An interesting feature of the data set is that it is a census for 
firms with 500 employees or more, the number of such large firms being around 1,000 
in a given quarter10.
In particular, this paper uses quarterly information on these large firms for the pe-
riod 1997:1-2002:1. Although the major methodological change introduced in the first 
quarter of 1997 does not affect the stratum of establishments with 500, it is only from 
this quarter that we have information on training suitable for our analysis.
In addition, establishments which have answered the questionnaire in some but not all 
of the quarters of the period 1997:1-2002:1 have also been selected. These characteristics 
of the sample allow us to build a non-balanced panel of establishments, which represent 
around 15 percent of total non-agriculture employment11. The number of observations is 
24,664. The average size of firms is 1,247 workers and the maximum is 19,922.
To determine the scope of the collective bargaining, the ECL questionnaire asks 
the establishments which type of agreement they have. The possible answers are as 
follows: bargaining at a plant or firm level; and bargaining at an above level (industry, 
province, regional or national). Table 1 shows that 33 per cent of the sample has plant/
firm-level collective agreements.
Our training variable is obtained from the part of the questionnaire devoted to lost 
working hours because of different reasons. One of them is because of workers attend-
ing training courses (either general or specific) during working hours. Training hours 
outside of work time, even when they are funded by the firm, are not included in the sur-
10 Those establishments whose workforce has occasionally fallen below 500 in any of the quarters 
remain in the sample.
11 This employment share is consistent with that coming from other sources. For instance, the 
Structure, Consciousness and Class Biography Survey (Encuesta de Estructura, Conciencia y Bi-
ografía de Clase, ECBC), carried out in 1991, shows that the employment share of private firms with 
1,000 employees or more was 10 percent. The Working Conditions Survey (Encuesta de Calidad de 
Vida en el Trabajo, ECVT), carried out in 2001, indicates that some 21 percent of non-agriculture 
employment corresponds to firms with 500 or more workers.
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vey. Therefore, we have a down-biased estimation of total training received by workers. 
However, training measured by our variable represents a relevant cost to firms because it 
is defined as lost working hours. Firms are assuming a relevant opportunity cost because 
of this training. Then we are capturing a part of the training whose costs are, at least par-
tially, assumed by the firm. A final characteristic of this variable is that we cannot distin-
guish whether training is general or specific. As this training is at least partially funded by 
firms, according to Becker, this training should be exclusively specific, but following Ac-
emoglu and Pishcke our training variable might contain general training. However, if our 
training variable is not affected by the different levels of collective bargaining, our vari-
able would only include specific training because we would have obtained a refutation 
of the Acemoglu-Pischke prediction in the Spanish institutional framework. A positive 
result would be in line with the Acemoglu-Pischke model, because collective agreements 
at the firm level would increase training funded (at least partially) by the firm.12 
As we have the amount of training hours we can build two different versions of the 
training variable. The first is regarding the level of training hours per 100 workers per quar-
ter. This is an indicator of the intensity of training activities in each firm. On average, estab-
lishments devote 59.6 training hours per 100 workers per quarter (see Table 1). The second 
one is a dichotomous variable where 1 refers to giving any training to their workers in the 
quarter and 0 means that firm does not give training at all to its workers in the quarter. This 
measure gives us information about the involvement of firms in training activities. Almost 
28 per cent of establishments have a positive amount of training hours (see Table 1).
For the sake of simplicity, in Table 2 we have aggregated the distribution of hours 
of training per worker in the following groups: establishments without training in the 
quarter; establishments with less than 100 hours per worker in the quarter; establishments 
with more than 100 hours per 100 workers. The threshold of 100 hours has been chosen 
because of the distribution shape of training hours. Figure 1 shows this distribution and 
we can see that above this threshold the number of firms decreases but we have a large 
enough size for this group (2,878 observations) to disaggregate by some categories.
Table 2 confirms that the scope of collective agreements is related to training hours. For 
firms which have zero training hours, the proportion of firms with collective agreements at 
12 A positive result might be coherent too with the exit-voice theory. However, to our knowledge, 
the exit-voice theory does not contain an explicit prediction about wage compression as does the 
Acemoglu-Pischke model, which is also observed for agreements at the firm level as we showed in 
section 2.2. Therefore, the Acemoglu-Pischke model would provide a more comprehensive interpre-
tation of a positive influence of agreements at the firm level on training provision.
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the firm level is much lower than those that have agreements of a higher? an above level (29.6 
per cent compared to 70.4). This result is coherent with previous descriptive results for Spain 
presented by Abellán et al. (1997) showing that firm agreements are correlated with more 
training. Table 2 also shows that a higher number of training hours is related to a higher share 
of establishments covered by collective agreements at the firm level, 36.6 per cent for firms 
with fewer than 100 hours and 53.8 per cent for those above 100 hours.
Finally, as some authors (for example, Arulampalam and Booth, 1998, for the UK, 
or Albert et al., 2005, for the Spanish case) have stressed that increasing flexibility us-
ing atypical contracts can negatively affect training, we have considered the proportion 
of workers with temporary contracts as well as the proportion of workers with full-time 
contracts. Table 2 shows that those establishments with more training hours have a lower 
proportion of workers with temporary or part-time contracts. While establishments with-
out training have 88.2 per cent of full-time workers, those establishments with less than 
100 training hours per 100 workers have 93.3 per cent and those with 100 or more train-
ing hours per 100 workers reach 96.7 per cent. On the other hand, temporary contracts in 
establishments without training represent 31.8 per cent of the total workforce, but in es-
tablishments with less than 100 training hours per 100 workers this proportion decreases 
to 26.9 and even to 16.9 in establishments with 100 or more training hours per 100 work-
ers. Therefore, the descriptive analysis confirms the usual presumption that when firms 
use more atypical contracts training is negatively affected.
3.2. Econometric Analysis
As we have two versions of the training variable, we will estimate a probit and a 
tobit model. In the probit model the dependent variable has only two values: 0 for those 
firms without training in a given quarter, and 1 for those firms with positive training 
hours in a given quarter. The rationale is to analyze the determinants of having training 
hours rather than the size of training hours. As our survey is a panel we have estimated 
a random-effects probit model.
The econometric model used to analyze the determinants of the size of training 
hours is a tobit model. As firms have zero or more training hours, and zeros have a clear 
meaning (no training at all in the firm at a given quarter) our dependent variable has a 
tobit form. As we have panel data, we estimate a random-effects tobit model13.
13 As we have used Stata 9.0 to estimate both models, we have checked whether the default 
number of quadrature points of the estimation affects the results or not. We have obtained very sta-
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In both models, the independent variables are the establishment characteristics 
which can be constructed from the information provided in the ECL database, and they 
are defined in Table 1. They are a time trend, the proportion of part-time workers, a set 
of industry dummies, the proportion of temporary and fixed-term workers, turnover14, 
a set of regional dummies, and three dummies of the firm’s size.
Our main variable of interest is the scope of collective bargaining because it is the proxy 
for the presence of organized labour in the establishment, as we have explained above.
In the probit model (Table 3), we see that the existence of bargaining at the firm level 
has a positive influence on having training hours and the estimation of the correspondent 
marginal effect (Table 4) shows that having collective agreements at the firm level increases 
the probability of having training in the firm by 11.4 per cent. Therefore, agreements at firm 
level increase training hours and this training is, at least partially, funded by the firm. The 
tobit model (Table 5) also presents a positive coefficient. In firms with a collective agree-
ment at the firm level, training increases around 1.5 hours per 100 workers15. 
It is important to note that firms that engage in firm level agreements may have 
some specific management strategies more prone to develop training funded by the 
firm. Not considering this unobserved heterogeneity would inflate the estimated impact 
of internal bargaining on training. In addition, there is no information in our database 
about some characteristics of the workers (such as age or educational level, for ex-
ble results especially for the variable capturing the scope of collective bargaining. In general, 
the rest of variables were very stable too, with the exception of the dummies related to the firm’s 
size. Therefore, the estimated effects for the firm’s size are less confident than the rest of effects.
14 We have defined worker turnover as the total gross worker turnover following García-Serra-
no and Malo (2002), who follow Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). Given the size of establishment 
i at times t (Ei,t) and t-1 (Ei,t-1), the average size of establishment i between t-1 and t is defined 
as follows: Ni,t = (Ei,t + Ei,t-1) / 2. By aggregating, it is possible to obtain the size of the whole 
economy: Nt = Σi Ni,t. The hiring (separation) rate is defined as the proportion of the number of 
workers arriving in (leaving) establishments between t-1 and t with respect to the employment 
stock: hi,t = Hi,t / Ni,t (si,t = Si,t / Ni,t). Then, by aggregating, we may calculate the aggregate hiring 
rate WPOSt = Σi (Ni,t / Nt) × hi,t and the aggregate separation rate WNEGt = Σi (Ni,t / Nt) × si,t The 
sum of both rates is the worker turnover or worker reallocation rate (WRt = WPOSt + WNEGt). It 
gives us an idea of gross external mobility of workers in the whole economy (or, as in our case, in 
the sample of the survey used in the analysis).
15 In addition, we have estimated a tobit model including annual and quarterly dummies and 
the results are quite similar. In this case, the coefficient for agreements at the firm’s level is 1.671. 
These results are available upon request.
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ample) potentially linked to the provision of training by the firm. We have estimated 
a conditional fixed-effect logit to eliminate the influence of time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. Table 6 shows the coefficient and the marginal effect of this estimation 
for the dummy variable of a collective agreement at the firm level. The coefficient is 
clearly positive and the marginal effect shows that this scope of the collective bargain-
ing increases the probability of having training in the firm by 30 per cent. Therefore, 
controlling by this type of unobserved heterogeneity in fact actually increases the effect 
of the scope of collective bargaining on the probability of having training hours. How-
ever, this fixed-effect logit is conditional to the sample used in the estimation which 
is different with respect to the original sample used to estimate the probit and tobit 
with random effects. The original sample amounts to 24,664 while the sample used to 
estimate the conditional fixed-effects logit model decreases to 11,371. In any case, the 
positive coefficient of this estimation supports the robustness of results.
To check the robustness of our results, we have estimated random and fixed-effects 
regressions on our continuous dependent variable. The results are also summarised in 
Table 6. As before, we have obtained positive coefficients, although they are lower than 
those obtained in the tobit model. In these models, the collective agreement at the firm 
level increases training hours around 0.26 or 0.27 hours per 100 workers per quarter, 
which are much lower than the original estimate for the tobit model (1.5). At any rate, 
as we obtain a positive coefficient, we consider the main result to be quite robust. 
Thus, collective agreements at the firm level not only increase the probability of 
having training, but the size of training too. These results are consistent with those 
studies for the UK finding a positive correlation between training incidence and mea-
sures of union presence, such as union coverage for collective bargaining or union 
density (Booth et al., 2003; Green et al., 1999). In other words, we have the same result 
under a different institutional framework.
This empirical evidence supports an interpretation in terms of the Acemoglu-Pis-
chke model. Not only is there a clear and positive influence of agreements at the firm 
level on a higher provision of training, but these agreements have a documented effect 
(Canal and Rodríguez, 2004) compressing wage structure. Therefore, we have a con-
firmation of the main prediction of the Acemoglu-Pischke model under the Spanish 
institutional settings, where collective agreements at the firm level would be a ‘friction’ 
increasing training provision by firms through their impact on wage compression16.
16 The positive effect of collective agreements at the firm level is potentially coherent with 
exit-voice theory, because in the Spanish institutional framework this type of agreement is the 
 74 MIGUEL Á. MALO Y NURIA SÁNCHEZ
 
We would like to point out that there is a previous article (Peraita, 2001) which 
attempts to test the Acemoglu-Pischke model predictions for the Spanish labour mar-
ket with negative results. Using data from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP), this author finds that firm-sponsored training is almost not affected by the 
compression of the wage structure. However, the evidence provided by Peraita (2001) 
does not focus on the relevance of the institutional mechanism for the causal effects 
identified in the Acemoglu-Pischke model. Therefore, we interpret such a negative re-
sult obtained by this author as a problem linked to the omission of variables related to 
the scope of collective bargaining17.
Although we are using data from firms with more than 500 workers, the estimated 
effect of collective agreements at the firm level is highly relevant, because this type of 
agreement is rather scarce for small and medium size firms.
Now we proceed to comment on other variables of interest.
Concerning the variable that measures the proportion of temporary workers with 
respect to the total workforce, the results confirm the negative influence on training 
(see Tables 3 and 5). A recent study for Spain (Albert et al., 2005) using individual data 
shows that workers with temporary contracts are not only less likely to be employed 
in training firms, but, once they are in those firms, they also have a lower probability 
of being chosen to participate in firm-provided training activities. In addition, research 
for other countries, such as Arulampalam and Booth (1998) for the UK, shows that 
workers with atypical contracts receive less training. Nevertheless, other researchers 
for the Spanish labour market (such as Tugores and Alba, 2002) find that the probabil-
ity of receiving training by the firm is not related to the worker having an open-ended 
or a temporary contract. In any case, these authors find significant differences among 
different temporary contracts. Workers with training and apprenticeship contracts re-
ceive training with a higher probability than the rest of workers with a different type of 
temporary contract.
transmission mechanism of the voice effects of organized labour (García-Serrano and Malo, 
2002). However, as we explained before, the role of these agreements is wage compression is not 
a crucial argument about the effects of the voice effect on training provision as in the Acemoglu-
Pischke model.
17 In any case, we want to highlight the fact that the ECHP database does not contain informa-
tion about which type of collective agreement applies in the firm of interviewees.
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  Another relevant difference related to the dichotomy of atypical/typical work-
ers is the distinction between full-time and part-time workers. We find that the propor-
tion of full-time workers increases training (Tables 3 and 5). Therefore, the economet-
ric analysis confirms that atypical contracts are, ceteris paribus, related to less training 
(here, a lower probability of having training or a lower amount of training hours).
The largest firms (those with more than 2,000 workers) are more likely to offer 
training18 (Tables 3 and 4). However, the size does not affect the amount of training 
hours (Table 5).Although, these results must be understood in a context where the firm 
has more than 500 employees (because of the avalaible data), we do not believe that 
changes a lot if we consider small firms, because in Spain the collective agreement at 
firm level is signed above all by great firms. Note that we obtain this result using only 
firms with more than 500 workers.
The set of industry dummies shows that the highest training is for the energy and 
industrial sector followed by information technology and R + D. Regional dummies 
show significant regional differences. Finally, we find an increasing time trend in hav-
ing training and training hours. Also, we check if the provision of training is concen-
trated in some quarters, and we could confirm that this fact is no significant in our data. 
In addition, we have checked whether the provision of training is concentrated in some 
quarters, but these dummy variables are not statistically significant19.
4. Conclusions 
Using a Spanish data we have analyzed the influence of the scope of collective 
bargaining on training provision by firms. As a difference with respect to the main part 
of previous research on training, we have not used individual data but a quarterly firms 
panel survey of large firms, the Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboural (ECL) or Survey of 
Economic Situation for the period 1997:1-2002:1. 
18 Black et al. (1999) support the idea that larger firms offer more training because they have 
lower training costs due to the larger number of employees in the training programs. However, 
we point out that our database only refers to firms with over 500 workers, in other words, only 
large firms. This limitation does not allow for an analysis about how the firm’s size affects train-
ing hours.
19 These estimations are available upon request.
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This article provides additional empirical evidence about the relevance of mar-
ket structure for training provision, but highlights the role of the institutional frame-
work. Following the Acemoglu-Pischke model on training provision by firms, we have 
looked for ‘friction’ in the Spanish institutional framework of the labour market af-
fecting wage compression as the theoretical model predicts and confirmed by previous 
literature concerning the Spanish labour relations system. This ‘friction’ is the collec-
tive agreement at the firm level, and the prediction to be tested was that firms with this 
type of collective agreement will have a higher level of training provision with respect 
to firms with above level agreements (because of the institutional framework of the 
Spanish labour market all workers are covered by a collective agreement, either at the 
firm or an above level). 
The empirical analysis shows that firms with a collective agreement at the firm 
level have a higher probability (11 per cent higher) of developing training and a higher 
amount of training (1.5 hours per 100 workers per quarter) with respect to firms cov-
ered by collective agreements at above levels. As our training variable is defined as 
working hours lost because of training, we can state that this investment is, at least, 
co-financed by the firm (lost working hours is a relevant opportunity cost of training).
Therefore, we confirm that our results support the Acemoglu-Pischke model under 
the Spanish institutional framework, where collective agreements at the firm level are 
the type of labour market imperfection considered by this theoretical model to affect 
a higher training provision by firms through the causal channel of wage compression. 
Under this interpretation of the institutional framework, our results are comparable 
with international research about the influence of organized labour on training provi-
sion by firms.
Finally, as an interesting side result, we have found a negative effect of higher 
proportions of atypical contracts (either temporary or part-time contracts) on the prob-
ability of counting hours lost by training and the amount of such training hours. These 
results are coherent with previous literature showing that workers with atypical con-
tracts have a lower probability of receiving training.
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All fi rms
With Coll. Agr. at 
fi rm level
W/O Coll. Agr. at 
fi rm level
Defi nition Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Training Training hours per 100 worker 59.66 215 104.3 292 37.1 158
Dtraining 1 if  training is >0; otherwise=0 0.279 0.44 0.36 0.48 0.23 0.42
Full-time 
workers
Full-time workers/total workers 0.900 0.18 0.94 0.18 0.87 0.19
Temporary 
workers
Temporary workers/total workers 0.293 0.31 0.15 0.31 0.36 0.33
Coll.Ag. 
Firm Level
1 if there is a fi rm level agreement; 
otherwise = cero.
0.335 0.47 — — — —
Turnover Job turnover rate (*) 3.095 8.57 1.486 3.5 3.907 1.01
Industry 
and energy
Industry dummy 0.238 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.12 0.33
Building Industry dummy 0.022 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.16
Trade and 
hospitality
Industry dummy 0.126 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34
Transport Industry dummy 0.084 0.27 0.19 0.39 0.02 0.16
Banking Industry dummy 0.100 0.29 0.03 0.17 0.13 0.34
R&D Industry dummy 0.016 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.14
Social 
Services
Industry dummy 0.415 0.49 0.18 0.39 0.52 0.49
Region1
1 if fi rm is located in Castilla-León and 
Castilla la Mancha; otherwise = 0
0.066 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.25
Region2
1 if fi rm is located in Galicia. Asturias. 
Cantabria and Basque Country ; 
otherwise = 0
0.115 0.31 0.15 0.35 0.09 0.29
Region3
1 if fi rm is located in Madrid; otherwise 
= 0
0.244 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.42
Region4
1 if fi rm is located in Catalonia. Valen-
cia and Murcia; otherwise = 0
0.243 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43
Region5
1 if fi rm is located in Andalucía and 
Extremadura; otherwise = 0
0.174 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38
Region6 
1 if fi rm is located in Aragón. La Rioja 
and Navarra; otherwise = 0
0.094 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.28
Region7
1 if fi rm is located in Balearic and 
Canary Islands; otherwise = 0
0.063 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.25
Table 1. Variables: Definitions and Summary Statistics
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All fi rms
With Coll. Agr. at 
fi rm level
W/O Coll. Agr. at 
fi rm level
Firmsize
<1001
1 if fi rm has 1000 or less employees; 
otherwise = 0
0.646 0.47 0.64 0.47 0.64 0.47
Firmsize 
1001-2000
1 if fi rm has 1001-2000 employees; 
otherwise = 0 
0.237 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
FiFirmsize
3>2000
1 if fi rm has more than 2000 employ-
ees; otherwise = 0
0.117 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31
Time trend
1 if  date is the fi rst quarter 1997. 
2 if date is the second quarter 1997. 
and so on… until 21 if date is the fi rst 
quarter 2002.
— — — — — —
Table 1 (cont.). Variables: Definitions and Summary Statistics
(*) The job turnover rate is defined as in García-Serrano and Malo (2002), following the indicators for 
job creation and destruction proposed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
Table 2. Hours of training per 100 workers in a quarter and characteristics of the firms
Zero hours <100 ≥100 TOTAL
Size of the fi rm (Average) 1.254 1.145 1.344 1.247
% Full-time Workers 88.2% 93.3% 96.7% 90.03%
% Temporary Workers 31.8% 26.9% 16.9% 29.3%
Main activity of the fi rm:
-Industry and energy 20.3% 25.8% 42,0% 23.8%
-Building 2.2% 2.1% 2.4% 2.2%
-Trade and  hotel business 15% 7.6% 4.5% 12.6%
-Transports and communications 8.4% 5,0% 13.1% 8.4%
-Banking 9.8% 10.1% 10.7% 10.0%
-R&D 1.7% 0.5% 2.3% 1.6%
-Social services 42.5% 48.8% 25.1% 41.5%
Collective Agreement:
-Firm level. 29.6% 36.6% 53.8% 33.6%
-Higher level. 70.4% 63.4% 46.2% 66.4%
Observations and percentages 17.786 (72.1%) 4.000 (16.2%) 2.878 (11.7%) 24.664 (100%)
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Table 3. Random-effects probit model on the probability of having training in the firm
Independent variables Coefi cients Std. Err.
Constant -1.613 0.234
Time trend 0.019 0.002
Full-time workers 0.856 0.169
Temporary workers -0.350 0.083
Coll.Ag.Firm Level 0,736 0.050
Turnover -0.002 0.002
Building -0,137 0.130
Trade and hotel business -0.967 0.112
Transport -0.108 0.090
Banking -0.521 0.089
R&D -0.815 0.152
Social Services -0.235 0.087
Region2 -0.069 0.109
Region3 -0.495 0.112
Region4 -0.407 0.099
Region5 -0.610 0.103
Region6 -0.374 0.107
Region7 -0.765 0.105
Firmsize<1001 -0.137 0.067
Firmsize1001-2000 -0.189 0.067
Nº observation 24.664
Rho * 0.742 0.007
Wald 656.9 (χ2(19))
* Rho is the proportion of the variance due to individual effects.
Source: ECL, 1997:1-2001:1
Table 4. Probit model: Marginal effects
Independent variables Mean Std. Err.
Full-time workers 0.133 0.029
Temporary workers -0.054 0.011
Coll.Ag.Firm Level 0.114 0.025
Turnover -0.000 0.000
Firmsize<1001 -0.021 0.004
Firmsize1001-2000 -0.029 0.006
Note: Marginal effects have been estimated following Arulampalam (1999). 
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Table 5. Random-effects tobit model on the amount of training hours in the firm
Independent variables Coefi cients Std. Err.
Constant -6.370 0.472
Time trend 0.042 0.005
Full-time workers 2.976 0.397
Temporary workers -0.250 0.187
Coll.Ag.Firm Level 1.463 0.118
Turnover 0.003 0.005
Building -2.125 0.306
Trade and hotel business -2.648 0.221
Transport -0.156 0.183
Banking -2.727 0.215
R&D -1.473 0.409
Social Services -2.429 0.151
Region2 -0.348 0.205
Region3 -0.902 0.186
Region4 -0.139 0.206
Region5 -0.192 0.195
Region6 -0.141 0.235
Region7 -0.639 0.234
Firmsize<1001 0.464 0.139
Firmsize1001-2000 0.010 0.145
Nº observation 24.664
         Censored 17.786
         Uncensored 6.878
Rho  * 0.647 0.007
Wald 1.412(χ2(19)) 
* Rho is the proportion of the variance due to individual effects.
Source: ECL, 1997:1-2001:1
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Figure 1. Hours of training per 100 workers and establishment’s size
Independent variables Mean Std. Err.
Conditional Fixed-Effects Logit *
Coll.Ag.Firm Level 1.377(0.112)
0.305
(0.057)
GLS Estimation with Random Effects
Coll.Ag.Firm Level 0.272(0.040)
OLS Estimation with Fixed-Effects
Coll.Ag.Firm Level 0.258(0.044)
* Number of cases: 11,371
Source: ECL, 1997:1-2001:1
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Figure 6. Summary of other estimations (S.E. between brackets)
